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I.
A.
¶1

¶2

INTRODUCTION

Preface: O Brave New World

The evident harm “Bokanovsky’s Process” does to the public good did not arise
from its mere discovery or existence. Instead, the harm arose from the monopolization of
the Process’ technology, used in pursuit of a single conception of the public good.
Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World describes “Bokanovskification” as a method of
human cloning that produced “[n]inety-six identical twins working ninety-six identical
machines!”1 In the novel, Bokanovsky’s Process came to be used exclusively for the
benefit of the Ford Motor Company and Henry Ford was the public’s “god” and
exclusive source of all that was good. Bokanovsky’s Process could solve all societal
problems by designing and “preconditioning” each member of society in such a way that
predestined him to accept (and indeed prefer) the role and status assigned to him by
“Alpha-Plus” scientists who were the “World Controllers.”2 Personal striving and
dissatisfaction would be eliminated and the “whole problem” would be solved.3
The “whole problem,” of course, is that individuals are never satisfied; individuals
are always striving for something better in their personal lives. Individuals invariably
insist on configuring the public order in a manner that will enhance their own private
lives. In Huxley’s Brave New World, Bokanovsky’s Process promised to eliminate the
vanity and social instability inherent in the constant struggle for individual happiness.
Exclusively possessing the scientific knowledge underlying Bokanovsky’s Process, the
World Controllers determined each individual’s wants and desires and, by “social
predestination,” took away the emotional slavery and utter frustration of free choice and
unrestrained, unsatisfied desire.4 Everybody was supposedly happy in the world of
Bokanovsky’s Process. Thus, Bokanovsky’s Process became the exclusive method of
achieving the public good in the World State—but only to the extent that achievement of
that public good was consistent with the private profit of the Ford Motor Company.5 The
public good became synonymous with a single person’s private gain.
∗

Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.S., J.D.,
and LL.M, University of Florida.
1
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 7 (HARPER PERENNIAL, 1998) (1932).
2
In the novel, Alpha Plus was the highest social caste in the World State and there were ten World
Controllers, all of whom were Alpha Plus males. Id. at 13, 34.
3
Id. at 7.
4
Id. at 13–18, 45.
5
Id. at 22-23, 48-52 (referring to the process of conditioning humans to consume “transport” and
“manufactured articles”). The Ford Model T was portrayed as the creation of the World State’s deity,
presumably Henry Ford. Id. at 25.
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Huxley’s demonstrated the absurdity of the belief that a singular definition of the
public good is even possible or desirable. The antiseptic absurdity of the World State in
Brave New World was not so much the existence of Bokanovsky’s Process, however. It
was instead that the technology and the resulting definition of the public good was
monopolized and enforced only insofar as the public good was consistent with a private
entity’s individual profit. In Huxley’s scheme, the private entity was the Ford Motor
Company and the public good thus became synonymous with Ford’s pursuit of profit;
public resources became exclusively devoted towards achievement of that individual
profit.6 The public’s benefit was actually subordinate to Ford’s private gain.
In the real world, to which tax policy applies, singular private control of tax
exemption-financed technology, goods, and services is not always contrary to the public
good.7 Nor is the pursuit of individual profit inherently inconsistent with achieving the
public good.8 Tax exemption jurisprudence—taxation being the primary method of
financing the public good—agrees too readily with the first of these conclusions, and
disagrees too readily with the second. Under present tax exemption jurisprudence,
exclusive licensing of tax exemption-financed technology is considered presumptively
necessary to extract the public good from that technology9 while the pursuit of whatever
individual profit may be derived from individual access to tax exemption-financed
technology is considered presumptively contrary to the achievement of the public
good.10These contradictory points resemble the view implicit in Huxley’s Brave New
World: that private individuals should be allowed exclusive ownership of technology and
thereby determine the processes by which the public good is achieved. Conversely,
individuals’ pursuit of profit outside of formally condoned exclusivity is contrary to the
public good.
The real absurdity of Huxley’s Brave New World and our own twenty-first century
tax exemption version is in the internal inconsistency contained in assumptions that

6

Id.
I use the phrase “tax exemption-financed” to make reference to the idea that tax exemptions are often
thought of as indirect government financing of particular activities. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City
of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (stating that granting tax exemption “necessarily operates to
afford an indirect economic benefit”); but see id. at 690-91 (Brennan, J., concurring) (acknowledging that
tax exemptions extend economic benefit, but stating that exemptions and direct subsidies are “qualitatively
different”).
8
The idea that the pursuit of individual profit is not inherently inconsistent with charitable tax
exemption has only recently been the subject of tentative acceptance. For example, I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2)
(2003) indicates that some revenue sharing arrangements between exempt organizations and their
employees is permissible, despite the prohibition against individual profit taking contained in I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (2003). See Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement
and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575 (2000) (an in-depth discussion of the prohibition against profittaking in the charitable context).
9
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(iii)(c)(4) (as amended in 1990) (stating that granting exclusive rights
to a financial sponsor of scientific research performed by tax exempt organization is permissible); Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(iv)(b) (stating that granting exclusive rights to scientific research performed by a
tax exempt organization is permissible if doing so is the only practical way to get the research results to the
public).
10
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718 (holding that joint ventures between exempt and non-exempt
entities are inconsistent with tax exemption if the exempt entity controls the venture). This ruling is based
on the notion that if the exempt entity controls, the venture will pursue profit and that the pursuit of profit is
inconsistent with the pursuit of public benefit. See generally Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and the
Unanswered Questions from Redlands, 89 TAX NOTES 121 (2000).
7
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The Private Benefit Doctrine

exclusive licensing of tax exemption-financed technology is necessary to the public good,
but that the pursuit of individual profit is contrary to the achievement of the public good.
These two ultimately contradictory assertions are found in two different but fairly
representative applications of the private benefit doctrine. The first instance involves
technology transfer—in this context, the tax regulations deem exclusive licensing of new
tax exemption-financed technology to be consistent, if not absolutely necessary, to the
public good.11 The second involves joint ventures between exempt and non-exempt
hospitals, an exclusive licensing of sorts. In that context, the tax regulations view the
exclusivity, one that ultimately benefits the for-profit partner, as presumptively
inconsistent with the public good.12 Private individuals, in both instances, are allowed to
monopolize tax exemption-financed technology (or other resources) ostensibly in pursuit
of the public good. Yet only in the latter instance does our jurisprudence object. The
different results are perplexing.
Huxley’s dramatized concern in Brave New World—or one that can be fairly
extrapolated from his story—is that when one person’s benefit becomes the standard of
the public good, there is no real public gain but only private benefit. Yet, logic dictates
that individuals must benefit if the public is to gain. The question implicit in Brave New
World, sought to be answered by the contemporary private benefit doctrine, is therefore
whether and to what extent is accomplishment of the “public good” consistent with the
monopolization of tax exemption-financed technology, goods, and services by
individuals with exclusive rights. We shall see that the private benefit doctrine
recognizes that identifiable private individuals need to benefit if the public good is to be
achieved. After all, the public is made up of individuals. In such instances, one
individual’s private good necessarily becomes coterminous, to one degree or another,
with the public good. But private individuals ought not to benefit ‘too much’ in the
pursuit of the public good, lest the public good be completely sacrificed.
Our two contextual examples—exclusive licensing of tax exemption-financed
technology and joint ventures involving exempt and non-exempt entities—represent the
apparent boundaries of necessary and tolerable individual gain. The conclusion with
respect to exclusive licensing suggests that new technology will not benefit the public
unless there is sufficient profit motive so that one or more individuals will take on the
expense of technology transfer. But the conclusion with regard to joint ventures suggests
that health care technology can be made available to the public without identifiable
individual profit, and that individual profit-making decreases the extent to which health
care is made available to the public. The conclusions in those apparent extremes provide
no theoretical matter with which to fill the space in between.
There must come a point when private pursuit of profit diverges from the
accomplishment of the public good. Ford’s concept of the public good in Brave New
World, for example, came to be synonymous with its own private gain, but there was a
recurring underlying hint of complete public insanity.13 In other words, there was a point
at which Ford’s private gain diverged from any reasonable conception of the public good
and thus should have been deprived of public financing. Likewise, the private benefit
11

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
13
In Brave New World, John, “the savage,” ultimately manifests this insanity through his suicide.
HUXLEY, supra note 1, at 259.
12
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doctrine ought to articulate a method to determine the optimal degree of private gain
necessary to the accomplishment of the public good, without allowing tax exemptionfinancing monopolies that result in an undercurrent of public fiscal insanity,
metaphorically speaking.
B.

Back to The Future

¶9

Even today, there is a danger of absurdity with regard to a singular, private
monopolization of tax exemption-financed technology, goods, or services. There are
dramatic examples that directly involve tax-exempt organizations. When two researchers
at the University of Florida developed “Gatorade Thirst Quencher”14 and then granted an
exclusive license to Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.,15 nobody seemed to question whether
granting such exclusive control of tax exemption-financed technology to private interests
was inappropriate from the standpoint of the public good. Perhaps there did not seem
much reason to question the license, assuming Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. paid a fair price.
Yet that publicly-funded technology eventually yielded, and continues to yield, millions
of dollars for private interests, which allowed Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. to capture and
control for itself a very lucrative market.16 Granted, no one can doubt that Stokely-Van
Camp, Inc. has been wildly successful in transferring the technology of “performanceenhancing soft drinks” to the public.17 Perhaps the public benefit arising from Gatorade
was and continues to be consistent with Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.’s immense private gain.
Gatorade, though, is just a soft drink and it is highly unlikely that Gatorade will
reconfigure society in a manner exclusively designed to achieve a single person’s private
benefit. As long as Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. paid fair market value for publicly financed
technology, there seemed no reason to question the exclusive transfer of what amounted
to a whole new market to one private individual who was then left to define the public
good, vis-à-vis that technology, synonymously with its private gain.
¶10
Today, however, tax-exempt organizations are not merely producing new soft
drinks. Some are exploring knowledge related to the creation and maintenance of life
itself. Stanford University recently announced the establishment of an institute formed to
study the potential uses of embryonic stem cells.18 Only a day or two before that, the
University of Minnesota announced that it had granted an exclusive license in newly
discovered adult stem cells to Athersys, Inc., a commercial biotechnology firm.19 Before
14

Gatorade was invented in 1965 by two University of Florida scientists, Dr. Dana Shires and Dr.
Robert Cade. See Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., The Gatorade Story, at http://www.gatorade.com (last visited
Nov. 12, 2003).
15
At the time of the invention, the University of Florida had no policy with regard to faculty inventions
and had to sue the inventors to obtain rights in the invention. The University eventually won a judgment
granting it a twenty percent royalty on Gatorade sales. It is estimated that, as of 1995, the University
received $4.5 million per year in royalties. See David Villano, Big Money on Campus, FLORIDA TREND,
Dec. 1, 1995, at 66, available at 1995 WL 8683002.
16
Stokely Van-Camp, Inc. is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Quaker Oats Company (having been
acquired in 1983). Gatorade commands approximately eighty-five percent (by total annual sales) of the
sports drink market. In 1999, revenues from the sale of Gatorade reached $1.8 billion worldwide. Betsy
McKay, PepsiCo Asks More of Gatorade Despite Its 85% Market Share, WALL ST. J., Jun. 11, 2002, at B4.
17
Gatorade is now available in approximately forty-seven countries. See Stokely Van-Camp, Inc.,
Global Availability, Products, at http://www.gatorade.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
18
Nicholas Wade, New Stanford Institute is to Study Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A29.
19
Andrew Pollack, ‘Politically Correct’ Stem Cell is Licensed to Biotech Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
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that, the University of Wisconsin granted an exclusive license in embryonic stem cells to
the Geron Corporation, another privately owned biotechnology firm.20 These
transactions, involving tax exemption-financed technology of the greatest magnitude to
date, beg the question whether tax exemption jurisprudence should be concerned with
more than just the simple economics of transfer. If a tax-exempt scientific organization
discovers monumental new technology, is the public good sufficiently protected by a
requirement that the organization not grant exclusive ownership in that technology except
upon the receipt of “fair compensation”? Or does the meaning of “public benefit”
embody more than simple economics?
¶11
It is unclear to what extent the public good, and tax exemption-financing proceeds
directed towards achieving that public good, may be made synonymous with private
individual gain. This question underlies much of contemporary tax exemption
jurisprudence related to the goal of ensuring that tax exemption-financing achieve public
good (rather than operate for private benefit). The favorable treatment accorded to the
technology transfer process, as well as hurdles faced by joint ventures seeking tax
exemption, ultimately revolves around this question.
¶12
This article explores tax law’s approach to the private control and use of tax
exemption-financing in the modern era. The article concludes that the area of tax law
most concerned with ensuring that the public is adequately served by charitable tax
exemption financing—the “private benefit doctrine”—is woefully unexplored,
undeveloped and unarticulated, particularly with regard to the use of tax exemptionfinanced technology to achieve a public good.21 Tax law’s legitimate interest in the topic
11, 2002, at C8. See Marilyn Chase and Antonio Regalado, Full Disclosure: Stanford Unveils Stem-Cell
Plans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at B1.
20
Standard Nonexclusive License Agreement dated January 1, 1996 between Registrant [Geron
Corporation] and Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation [Exhibit 10.11][Jan. 1, 1996], in Form S-1
Registration Statement [Geron Corporation][June 12, 1996][File #: 333-05853], as superseded by License
Agreement with Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation [and Geron Corporation][April 23, 1999][Exhibit
10.1], in Form 10-Q Quarterly Report [Geron Corporation][Nov. 15, 1999], as superseded by License
Agreement dated as of January 8, 2002, by and between Registrant [Geron Corporation] and Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation [Exhibit 10.1][Jan. 8, 2002], in Form 8-K Current Report [Geron
Corporation][Jan. 18, 2002], available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
Between the time of the original agreement and subsequent agreements, the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation [hereinafter “WARF”] became dissatisfied with Geron Corporation’s plans to commercialize
the stem cell lines that were the subject of the original agreement. In addition, WARF was concerned with
Geron’s assertion of exclusive access to certain stem cell lines, particularly in light of a newly announced
policy of limited federal funding to sixty-four lines of existing stem cells, the United States’ supply of
which was owned by WARF, through its subsidiary, WiCell Research Institute. After negotiations between
the parties failed, WARF filed suit seeking to terminate the Geron’s rights to expand the exclusive license
to any other stem cells owned by WARF. The last superseding agreement of January 8, 2002 essentially
embodies the out of court settlement between the parties. For a concise history of the dispute between
WARF and Geron regarding stem cell, see Antonio Regalado, Research, Red Ink: An Academic Group
Seeks Balance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002, at B4; see also David P. Hamilton and Antonio Regalado,
Geron Gives Up Some Stem-Cell Rights, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002 at A3; see also Press Release, Geron
Corporation, (Jan. 9, 2002) [Exhibit 99.1], cited in Form 8-K Current Report [Geron Corporation],
available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
21
I have previously touched on this subject in the context of addressing more particular issues
pertaining to charitable tax exemption. See generally Jones, supra note 11 (regarding joint ventures
between charitable and non-charitable health care entities); see also Darryll K. Jones, “First Bite” and the
Private Benefit Doctrine: A Comment On Temporary and Proposed Regulation 53.4958-4T(a)(3), 62 U.
PITT. L. REV. 715 (2001) (regarding proposed regulations under I.R.C. § 4958). These previous articles
focused on the resolution of specific issues. This article gives primary focus to the private benefit doctrine
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is derived from two underlying assumptions. First, taxation is manifestly based on the
assumption that when individuals experience economic gain, they should financially
contribute to the maintenance of the societal structure that makes that gain possible.22
Second, taxation assumes that no person should be made individually wealthier by what
otherwise appears as economic activity.23 Instead, the activity is assumed to be
exclusively supportive of societal structure—of public good, rather than private benefit.
It is implicitly assumed that charity and profit making cannot coexist—this assumption is
the one responsible for much of the uncertainty in tax exemption jurisprudence.24
¶13
In any event, the two explicit assumptions—first, that tax-exempt economic
activity benefits society, and second, that tax exemption should not confer identifiable
individual wealth—are enforced via three doctrines that are often difficult to distinguish:
the eligibility of an organization for tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code
(“I.R.C.”), the private inurement doctrine, and the private benefit doctrine. Initially, tax
exemption requires that the exempt activity be conducted primarily for a purpose
enumerated in I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3).25 This requirement is thought to define the
difference between economic activities that should be taxed and those that should not.
Yet, an activity with a charitable purpose can often appear identical to one with a profitmaking purpose.26 That profit-making and charitable activities can indeed appear
identical27 is only the first strand of evidence in rebuttal to the notion that profit and
charity cannot co-exist.
¶14
In many (but not all) instances, the determination of whether an activity is
conducted for a charitable purpose depends on the application of two other sub-

itself, though it uses real life issues for context.
22
The imposition of tax liability is premised on clearly realized “accessions to wealth.” Comm’r v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). For a theoretical expansion of this assertion, see HENRY
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 1-40 (1938).
23
There are, undoubtedly, many theories of charitable tax exemption and many types of charitable
organizations. But, as Professor Hansmann noted, the essential characteristic for tax exemption is the
“nondistribution constraint.” Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L. J. 835, 838
(1980). In the United States, tax exemption is to be granted only in situations “in which no man receives a
scintilla of individual profit.” 44 Cong. Rec. S4150-51 (1909) (statement of Sen. Bacon) (regarding the
enactment of the original predecessor to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). See also Jones, supra note 9 (analyzing the
history and application of the private inurement prohibition).
24
Of course, the assumption is no longer unquestionably accepted. See supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
25
I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2003); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990).
26
Thus, Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) states “an organization may meet the requirements of
section 501(c)(3) although it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the
operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization’s exempt purpose or purposes . . .
.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e). See also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 566, 585 (1997)
There are a number of lines of commerce in which both for-profit and nonprofit entities participate.
Some educational institutions, some hospitals, some child care facilities, some research organizations
and some museums generate significant earnings; and some are operated by not-for-profit
corporations.
27
Compare Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct.Cl. 1961) (religious publishing
organization held tax exempt despite the presence of substantial profits), with Inc. Trustees of Gospel
Worker Soc’y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 381 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(court denies tax exemption to a religious publishing organization because of its “commercial hue,”
including the presence of profit).
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doctrines.28 First, the “private inurement doctrine” states that an organization is not
operated for a charitable purpose and is therefore not entitled to tax exemption if it
distributes its net earnings to managers or other persons in a position analogous to owners
of for-profit organizations.29 Clearly, this doctrine relates to the idea that tax exemption
is appropriate only to the extent that there are no gains in individual wealth. Second, the
“private benefit doctrine” states that an organization does not operate for a charitable
purpose and therefore is not entitled to tax exemption “unless it serves a public rather
than a private interest.”30 Occasionally, judicial opinions apply the private benefit
prohibition but judicial discussion is generally devoid of any obvious criteria or theory.31
Rather, these instances where the private benefit doctrine dictates the outcome seem to be
the most obvious of cases.32 In most judicial opinions regarding the private benefit
doctrine, the purpose to achieve individual gain is too obvious to ignore and revocation of
tax exemption seems all but a fait accompli.33 In any event, the absence of individual
wealth, particularly since individual wealth is considered inconsistent with charity, is
thought to guarantee the accomplishment of public benefit.
¶15
The prohibition against private inurement does not resolve the issue with which this
article is concerned. Granting exclusive rights in tax exemption-financed assets is
legitimate vis-à-vis the private inurement doctrine if that grant is made for fair
compensation.34 The private inurement doctrine is relevant to our inquiry but does not go
far enough since it is an exclusively economic construct. Economic fairness cannot be
the sole criteria by which to determine whether the public good is achieved. The broader,
more important issue speculates as to whether the grant of an exclusive license is really
“good” for society and on whose behalf is the exempt grantor acting, notwithstanding the
economic equivalency of the exchange. The label “private benefit” will therefore be used
as shorthand for the analysis that seeks to resolve that issue. The prevailing underlying
analysis, however, is insufficient to the task. The “private benefit” analysis is either
outdated, relative to today’s technology, or more likely was never sufficient.
¶16
This article aims to establish and then resolve this insufficiency. It begins by
exploring the scant, but somewhat consistent, regulatory and judicial articulation of the
private benefit doctrine and compares these articulations with those set forth by the
Internal Revenue Service (“the Service”) in its non-binding administrative documents.
This article selects what it concludes is the better approach—the Service’s non-binding

28

In some instances there is neither individual wealth nor a lack of public benefit and yet the activity
will still be viewed as conducted for a non-exempt purpose. See, e.g., Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g Co.
v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 1070 (1982) (organization’s tax exempt status revoked despite the absence of
individual accession to wealth or the lack of public benefit, because the organization operated for a
commercial rather than exempt purpose).
29
Unlike the private benefit doctrine, the prohibition against private inurement is explicitly stated in
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
30
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
31
See, e.g., KJ’s Fund Raisers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 669 (1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 1200 (2d
Cir. 1998) (denying tax exemption on the basis of private benefit).
32
Id.
33
See supra note 32. See also Lowry Hosp. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 850 (1976) (noting nonprofit
hospital’s operations were so intertwined with that of private individual as to prevent it from operating for
public benefit but rather for individual gain).
34
Cf. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2003) (defining an “excess benefit transaction” as one in which an insider
obtains an organization’s services or assets for less than fair market value).
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administrative articulation—and then asserts the most convincing underlying theoretical
explanation for that approach.
¶17
The article begins from the presumption that the Service does indeed know best
about the doctrine of private benefit. The reason that the Service’s view has not been
explicitly adopted in a formal sense might be because the Service has never explained
and defended the theoretical underpinnings of its articulation of the private benefit
doctrine. It either cannot articulate a defensible rationale for what it instinctively knows
to be right or it simply does not consider it important enough to do so. The most likely
underlying rationale, one that is the raison d’etre of this article, is that “charity” is
defined qualitatively—in that charity is all things “good”—and quantitatively—that is, to
benefit the public, good things must enhance the lives of the great multitudes in roughly
equal proportions, without regard to status or class.35 Only when economic activities are
good, qualitatively and quantitatively, should they be labeled “charity” worthy of tax
exemption-financing.
¶18
This article seeks to provide an analysis by which to determine whether something
is quantitatively good so that it is indeed worthy of tax exemption (assuming it is also
good qualitatively). Whether an activity is qualitatively “good” so that it is worthy of the
title “charity” is a great imponderable beyond the scope of this article.36 Indeed, others
have sought to define “charity” from a qualitative standpoint and, in essence, have left us
only with the notion that charity is that which is qualitatively “good.”37 Ultimately, the
private benefit doctrine concerns itself with whether an activity is quantitatively worthy
of the “charity” label because it affects sufficient numbers of people equally, and thus
deserves tax exemption financing. When an activity fails the quantitative test of
“charity,” it confers a private benefit and is unworthy of tax exemption-financing.
¶19
After relating the proof that the private benefit doctrine represents a quantitative
definition of charity, the article refines and restates the Service’s articulation in the form
of a proposed regulation (“the Restatement”) that includes examples designed to direct
focus on key aspects.38 The Service’s articulation of the doctrine is under-developed. The
Service’s informal articulation of the private benefit doctrine implicitly recognizes noneconomic considerations, but neither identifies those non-economic considerations nor
provides a hint as to the weight that should be given to those non-economic
considerations. Therefore, this article seeks to complete the articulation using technology
transfer and healthcare as helpful context. Thereafter, the article defends its proposed
35

Professor Atkinson is particularly eloquent in this regard:
Regard for others need not embrace the whole world. Rather, it spreads in concentric circles
from immediate family to clan, tribe, class, and nation, perhaps to embrace all humanity.
Moving outward along these expanding ripples of concern for others, one eventually crosses the
frontier of charity. That frontier is defined somewhat differently in the lay and the legal
parlance, but both are clear on the essential point. Though charity may begin at home, it is
worthy of the name [and tax exemption] only after it has crossed the threshold.
Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C.L. REV. 501, 532 (1990).
36
For an attempt to define “charity” from a qualitative standpoint, see Lars Gustafsson, The Definition
of “Charitable” For Federal Income Tax Purposes: Defrocking the Old and Suggesting Some New
Fundamental Assumptions, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 587 (1996).
37
Id.
38
The Restatement contained herein is essentially a significant redrafting of a proposal this author has
made in two prior articles that have sought to apply the private benefit doctrine to particular controversies.
See supra note 21 (citing the author’s previous articles relating to this subject).
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Restatement against the more obvious criticism, primarily its inherent subjectivity. The
short answer is that subjectivity ought to be encouraged with regard to any concept of
“public benefit.” There is need for a Restatement that tolerates diverse conceptions of
public benefit while simultaneously providing enforcement against “too much” individual
benefit. Finally, the article returns once again to its original contextual examples—stem
cell technology and Gatorade—to summarize the likely rationale underlying the private
benefit doctrine and why the proposed Restatement is superior to present regulatory
articulation.
¶20
This article never argues that the tax-exempt organizations necessarily violate a
public trust by granting the exclusive rights of their technologies to single individuals or
commercial entities.39 By the same token, though, the article challenges the view that
private gain ought to constitute a nearly insurmountable obstacle to tax exemption, such
as is the case with joint ventures.
¶21
In a capitalist society—one that accepts the individual profit motive as the best
means to supply goods and services—there is simply no logical basis to argue that private
gain is inherently inconsistent with the public good. Instead, the article points out that
because the prevailing private benefit analysis lacks an explanation or understanding of
its purpose and theoretical basis, it never demands consideration of the political and
social issues raised when private, identifiable individuals are the conspicuous vehicles by
which the public good is achieved. The result, it seems, is a vague judicial and
administrative groping through the various contexts in which private benefit ought to
apply more clearly.40 The restated private benefit doctrine would not necessarily alter the
outcomes in any given case, but would change the process and thereby allow for more
efficient and predictable outcomes. In doing so, the private benefit doctrine will finally
serve the purpose of ensuring that tax exemption-financing furthers the public good even
as it might provide opportunity for private individual wealth.
II.
¶22

THE PREVAILING JUDICIAL PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE

The importance of a correctly articulated private benefit doctrine derives from the
fact that profit-making activities are no longer so readily distinguishable from “good”
activities presumptively worthy of tax exemption-financing that it is easy to determine
when tax exemption is appropriate.41 Scholars and judges concerned with the meaning of
“charity” for purposes of tax exemption typically begin by referring to the Statute of

39

To be accurate, I should note that some of the universities discussed in this article are not actually tax
exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Instead, the income derived by the University of Florida and the
University of Minnesota—two institutions that have not applied for recognition under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)—
is exempt either under I.R.C. § 115 (2003) or the (highly debatable) common law proposition of
“intergovernmental tax immunity.” See State of Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (1994) (discussing
intergovernmental immunity). Nevertheless, the fact that some state universities have not actually applied
for recognition—though clearly they would qualify—is but a minor detail since exemption from tax, under
whatever theory, is axiomatically based on the assumption of public benefit.
40
Exclusive licensing of tax exemption-financed technology, for example, is presumptively acceptable
when perhaps it ought to be considered without a beginning presumption. Joint ventures between charitable
organizations and for profit organizations are presumptively unacceptable when perhaps they too should be
judged without prejudice.
41
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Charitable Uses,42 (the “Statute”) an English law enacted more than 400 years ago.43 The
Statute’s preamble supported the concept that tax exemption is appropriate in the absence
of personal gain and only in the presence of public benefit.44 Apparently, there had been
notorious instances in which charitable trusts were abused for private gain in violation of
the underlying assumptions of charitable tax exemption.45 But the Statute does nothing
more than confirm one of the two assumptions underlying tax exemption—that
exemption be granted and reserved for activities that provide public benefit rather than
personal gain.46 The Statute lends evidence in support of the axiomatic assertion that tax
exemption ought to be reserved for activities conducted exclusively for the public good.
However, the matter is left at that. Just like the American modern-day version contained
in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), the Statute provides no hint or clue as to how the public good is to
be determined or distinguished from private benefit, once activities proceed beyond
presumptively charitable activities such as feeding the poor.47 Additionally, the
seventeenth century world in which the Statute was relevant is entirely foreign to today’s
world in which the creation or regeneration of life itself is sometimes at stake.
¶23
Four “heads of charity”48 derived from the Statute—(1) poverty relief, (2)
education, (3) religion, and (4) things beneficial to the community49—essentially
comprise a list of qualitative examples of charity, but give no hint as to how the public
good is to be determined if not specifically within those examples. Nor does the Statute

42

Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (Eng.), available at
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.phall.hauser.ksg/01.%20Charitable%20uses.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
43
See, e.g., Nina Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998); James Fishman, The
Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda For Reform, 34 EMORY L. J. 617, 621 (1985).
44
The preamble included the definition of “charitable uses” gifts:
some for Relief of aged, impotent and poor People, some for Maintenance of sick and Maimed
Soldiers and Mariners, Schools of Learning, Free Schools, and Scholars in Universities, some
for Repair of Bridges, Points, Havens, Causeways, Churches, Sea banks and Highways; Some
for Education and Preferment of Orphans, some for or towards Relief, Stock or Maintenance for
Houses of Correction, some for Marriages of poor Maids, some for Supportation, aid, and help
of young Tradesman, Handicraftesmen and persons decayed, and others for Relief or
Redemption of Prisoners or Captives, and for Aid or Ease of any poor Inhabitants concerning
Payments of Fifteens, setting out of Soldiers and other Taxes.
Statute of Charitable Uses at 43.
45
The statute was entitled: “An Act to Redress the Mis-employment of Lands, Goods, and Stocks of
Money Heretofore Given to Charitable Uses.” Id.
46
For a survey of English and American cases interpreting charity to mean those things that enhance the
public good, see Gustafsson, supra note 36, at 617-44.
47
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2003) provides exemption for:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or
to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.
48
Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601-2001: An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 731, 734 (2001).
49
Comm’rs for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, 1891 A.C. 531 (H.L 1891).
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assist in distinguishing between present day situations involving qualitatively “good”
activities conducted for personal profit from qualitatively “good” activities conducted for
the public good. Recall that in today’s society good activities, such as education and
health care are conducted by profit-takers and good Samaritans alike. In any event, there
is little, if any, contemporary or even historical evidence that original or subsequent
lawmakers were or are even cognizant of the Statute of Uses, or that they intentionally
sought or seek to inject, under the label “private benefit,” whatever theory of public good
the Statute may have contained.50 The Statute is therefore relevant only to the qualitative
definition of charity—as it helps answer the question of what is “good” from a qualitative
perspective. Even then, it provides no articulated definition of qualitative charity. It
appears instead that “charity” was and continues to be a concept assumed by all
concerned to be easily recognized, even if difficult to precisely articulate.
¶24
As the world grows in complexity and individual profit making becomes the
universal method by which to achieve the public good,51 qualitative notions of charity no
longer provide a sufficient basis upon which to allocate tax exemption-financing.As
noted earlier, activities historically conducted for purposes other than profitmaximization, such as health care, education, and scientific research, are now routinely
undertaken in the successful and lucrative pursuit of profit.52 Charitable activities are no
longer conspicuously distinguishable from profit-making activities. If qualitative “good”
were truly sufficient to grant tax exemption financing, such financing would be
appropriate even in the presence of unabashed individual profit-making. On the other
hand, some historically presumptive charitable activity, such as theoretical scientific
research, is no longer universally viewed as automatically consistent with the public good
from a non-financial viewpoint. Our changing context dictates that the quantitative
notion of charity underlying the prohibition of private benefit assume much greater
importance, to the extent the qualitative differences between altruistic “good” activities
and their theoretical opposite—individual profit-seeking activities—become
indistinguishable or subject to question.
¶25
Understandably, lawmakers and judges’ serious consideration of the private benefit
doctrine does not extend even as far back as the seventeenth century.53 Lawmakers—
primarily judicial and executive branch lawmakers—were forced to devote serious
consideration to the private benefit doctrine during the mid- to late-1980s. Though
effectuated on fair financial terms, consolidations and other financing techniques
involving tax-exempt health care organizations provoked stakeholders from all sectors to
50

There is almost nothing that would, by contemporary standards be referred to as “legislative history”
with regard to the original enactment of the charitable tax exemption. See Jones, supra note 8, at 591
(describing the scant legislative materials accompanying the original predecessor to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
See Gustafsson, supra note 36, at 618 ( “Congress gave no indication when it passed an income tax in
1894, 1909, or 1913 of the appropriate definition of charitable for purposes of the exemption provisions nor
when it provided for the deductibility of charitable contributions in 1917.”).
51
A good example of the acceptance of the profit motive as the primary means of providing for human
welfare is seen in China’s transition from a Socialist to a Capitalist society. See A. Doak Barnett, China’s
Modernization: Development and Reform in the 1980’s, in CHINA’S ECONOMY LOOKS TOWARD THE YEAR
2000 (VOL. 1), S. REP. NO. 99-149, at 6 (1986).
52
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
53
This is not to say that American judges had not previously referred to the Statute of Charitable Uses.
American courts have frequently acknowledged the Statute as a sort of genesis of American tax exemption.
See Lars Gustafson, supra note 36, at 609-13.
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ask whether such consolidations were nevertheless contrary to the public good.54 In
particular, tax-exempt health care organizations began to adopt the very same marketing
and operational processes used by taxable health care organizations.55 In doing so, they
made it more qualitatively difficult to distinguish “charitable” activities deserving of tax
exemption-financing from profitable activities. As noted earlier, the American successor
to the Statute of Charitable Uses provides no guidance in this regard. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
does not even contain an explicit reference to the private benefit doctrine.56 Nor does it
define operative terms such as “charitable” or “educational.” Reading a private benefit
prohibition into the statute is therefore neither illegitimate nor illogical, to the extent there
is consensus that “charitable” ought to embody public rather than individual benefit. The
Statute of Charitable Uses, though it provides no guidance as to how to actually
determine public benefit, at least confirms that “charitable” necessarily embodies some
sort of public benefit. It is not only reasonable to read the Statute for tax exemption as
implicitly raising the private benefit prohibition, it is necessary in light of the increasing
inability to identify a qualitative definition of charity.
¶26
The relevant interpretative regulation is somewhat more explicit than I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) with regard to articulating the private benefit doctrine, although ultimately it
merely restates the axiom that tax exemption is premised on public betterment and is
presumptively inconsistent with individual accessions to wealth:
¶27
An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more of the
purposes specified in subdivision (i) (listing the seven exempt purposes specifically
mentioned in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)) unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.
Thus, to meet the requirements of this subdivision (i.e., the requirements for charitable
tax exemption), it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not organized or
operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or
his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly
by such private interests.57
¶28
The quoted provision represents the sum and substance of the private benefit
doctrine as presently articulated. Except for the inclusion of the phrase, “designated
individuals,” the regulation actually seems most concerned with the private inurement
prohibition, which is explicitly stated in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), rather than a separate notion
of quantitative charity.58 The regulation thus provides no guidance beyond the
admonition that charity implies public rather than private benefit.

54
Indeed, even a cursory review of recent developments will show that changes in the health care
industry that began roughly twenty years ago have had significant, perhaps disproportionate impact on tax
exemption jurisprudence. Most, though not all, of the significant cases and new legal doctrines in the last
2–4 years have involved or been motivated by the health care industry. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1
C.B. 718, (relating to hospital joint ventures), I.R.C. § 4958 (2003) (motivated, in part, by the use of
revenue sharing arrangements in the health care industry), IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M.
593 (CCH) (2001) (relating to exemption for health maintenance organizations).
55
For an overview, see Darryll K. Jones, Tax Exemption Issues Facing Academic Health Centers in the
Managed Care Environment, 24 J.C. & U. L. 261 (1997).
56
See infra note 47.
57
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
58
Id. Even the inclusion of the phrase, “designated individuals,” does not necessarily suggest
otherwise, if the phrase is defined by reference to the other specified persons whose interests are not to be
benefited by the organization.
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American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner59 provides the most widely cited,
and often criticized analysis by which to determine whether an organization is operating
for the public benefit rather than for a private interest. In that case, the Tax Court held
that an educational organization benefited private interests and therefore did not deserve
tax exemption because the organization intended that all of its graduates work for one
particular industry participant.60 Had there been no intent that the organization’s
operations benefit an identifiable individual or group, according to the Tax Court, the
organization might have been entitled to tax exemption.61 The conclusion seems entirely
reasonable even to the disinterested. Certainly, it is consistent with the assumptions
underlying tax exemption—exemption is appropriate in the absence of individual gain
and only when the public benefits. To its credit, American Campaign Academy raises the
point that some degree of individual gain is necessary to achieve the public good.62 It
fails only in that it provides no method or analysis by which to determine when
individual gain from an activity overtakes public benefit and thereby forfeits the right of
tax exemption financing.
¶30
There are three distinct logical steps in American Campaign Academy that should
be made explicit because those steps contribute to a method of analysis conducive to an
ultimate resolution. The first step has already been mentioned: in order to exclusively
benefit the public, an organization must necessarily confer a benefit on particular
individuals. The Tax Court’s example is that an educational institution must educate and
therefore confer a benefit on particular individuals in order to benefit the public.63 In
other words, the public is composed of individuals and particular individuals must
receive or make use of public goods if the public is to benefit. The second step from
American Campaign Academy is that if a secondary benefit is reserved for a select
individual or group unnecessarily, the secondary benefit is “non-incidental” and therefore
“impermissible.”64 The Court did not give a specific illustration but assume, for example,
that an educational organization provides aeronautical training. The public benefits when
individuals are trained and, secondarily, private airline companies also benefit from the
accomplishment of the organization’s purpose. But if training is provided only for family
members of people who work for a single airline company, there is a reservation of that
secondary benefit for a select individual (in this case, the airline corporation). The
organization’s primary purpose—education—could be viewed as a qualitative “good”
deserving of tax exemption in the abstract, but the reservation of individual betterment to
a select group (a reservation unrelated to the accomplishment of the charitable goal)
belies any conclusion that the organization is operating to benefit the public exclusively.65
¶29

59

92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
“[W]e find that petitioner conducted its educational activities with the partisan objective of benefiting
Republican candidates and entities.” Id. at 1070.
61
“Had the record established that the Academy’s activities were nonpartisan in nature and that its
graduates were not intended to primarily benefit Republicans, we would have a different case. We are not,
however deciding such a case.” Id. at 1079.
62
Id. at 1074.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1074-75.
65
The Service’s argument, with which the Tax Court specifically agreed, was as follows:
where the training of individuals is focused on furthering a particular targeted private interest,
the conferred secondary benefit ceases to be incidental to the providing organization’s exempt
60
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To state the matter in the vernacular adopted in this article, education is qualitatively
“charitable” but the provision of education in this hypothetical instance fails the
quantitative imperative because a few individuals obtain special benefit unnecessarily.
¶31
This implication also seems entirely reasonable as it enforces the notion that tax
exemption is inappropriate without exclusive public betterment. The first two steps from
American Campaign Academy, then, are easily rationalized in light of the assumptions
underlying tax exemption. The third step, however, is that although individual
betterment may be non-incidental, it is nevertheless consistent with tax exemption,
provided that the non-incidental individual betterment is insubstantial relative to
whatever public good the organization otherwise pursues or achieves.66 For example, an
educational organization that conducts several aeronautical education programs, only one
of which is reserved for family members of a particular airline, would be conferring a
private benefit and still be entitled to tax exemption, assuming the private benefit is
insubstantial. Thus, the Tax Court’s overall analysis with regard to the private benefit
doctrine involves a consideration of necessary individual betterment, unnecessary
individual betterment, and a de minimis exception that injects an apparent cost-benefit
standard into the inquiry. The cost-benefit portion of the inquiry represents a
determination that more harm would arise from the denial or revocation of tax exemption
than from the allowance of tax exemption despite the presence of a small amount of
private benefit.
III. THE SERVICE’S INFORMAL ARTICULATION OF THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE
¶32

The Internal Revenue Service pointedly disagrees with the idea that public
betterment justifies or excuses relatively insignificant private benefit. The Service states
and demonstrates its analysis most clearly in a 1978 non-binding administrative
communication, General Counsel Memorandum (“GCM”) 39,862.67 GCM 39,862 begins
by acknowledging that some degree of individual betterment is necessary to achieve the
public good.68 The Service’s example involves a tax-exempt hospital: private physicians
must be provided with certain privileges beneficial to their individual practices if the
hospital is to serve the public good.69 From this point, however, the Service’s analysis
diverges from that employed in American Campaign Academy. American Campaign
purposes. By contrast . . . when secondary benefits are broadly distributed, they become
incidental to the organization’s exempt purpose.
Id. at 1074.
66
Id. at 1066, stating:
Thus, should petitioner be shown to benefit private interests, it will be deemed to further a
nonexempt purpose under section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. This nonexempt
purpose will prevent petitioner from operating primarily for exempt purposes absent a showing
that no more than an insubstantial part of its activities further the private interests or any other
nonexempt purposes.
Section 1.501(c)(3)(1), Income Tax Regs.
67
General Counsel Memorandum 39,862 cites to a previous administrative ruling, General Counsel
Memorandum 37,789 as precedential authority. The latter ruling does, indeed, represent the Service’s first
articulation of its view of the private benefit doctrine, but GCM 39,862 is most often cited as the source of
the doctrine.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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Academy holds that all necessary private benefit is “incidental” and therefore consistent
with tax exemption.70 Conversely, the Service’s analysis states that even when the
private betterment is necessary to the accomplishment of a public good, the private
benefit may be so immense, compared to the public good achieved solely by the activity
conferring the private benefit, that tax exemption is unjustified. In particular, the analysis
states:
¶33
Any private benefit arising from a particular activity must be “incidental” in both a
qualitative and quantitative sense to the overall public benefit achieved by the activity if
the organization is to remain exempt. To be qualitatively incidental, a private benefit
must occur as a necessary concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large; in
other words, the benefit to the public cannot be achieved without necessarily benefiting
private individuals. Such benefits might also be characterized as indirect or
unintentional. To be quantitatively incidental, a benefit must be insubstantial when
viewed in relation to the public benefit conferred by the activity. It bears emphasis that,
even though the exemption of the entire organization may be at stake, the private benefit
conferred by an activity or arrangement is balanced only against the public benefit
conferred by that activity or arrangement, not the overall good accomplished by the
organization.71
¶34
The Service does not explain the assertion that even necessary individual benefit
may be too great to tolerate (i.e., that private benefit must be necessary and
“insubstantial”). It may mean that stakeholders should ask in any particular case whether
the public good is important enough to justify tax subsidization of the private betterment,
however necessary that betterment may be to the accomplishment of the exempt
purpose.72 A second possible way of phrasing this inquiry is by asking whether the
individual betterment is of such magnitude that tax subsidization is unnecessary.
¶35
The difference between the two assumed formulations seems slight, but they focus
on distinct, yet equally important, considerations. The first question focuses on whether
the public good is of such importance that the political imperative of dispersing tax
subsidized betterment equally to the body politic should be sacrificed.73 This question
concentrates on the political appropriateness of the tax subsidy in light of the significant
70

Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1066, 1073-74.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 18, 1978).
72
The question has most often arisen in the context of nonprofit hospitals that pursue ties with for-profit
hospitals or even to convert to for profit status. See, e.g., Kevin Donohue, Crossroads in Hospital
Conversions—A Survey of Nonprofit Hospital Conversion Legislation, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39 (1999);
Shelley A. Sackett, Conversion of Not-For-Profit Health Care Providers: A Proposal for Federal
Guidelines on Mandated Charitable Foundations, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 247 (1999).
73
The political notion of equality as relevant to private benefit analysis was first raised in one of my
previous articles. See generally Jones, supra note 10 at 132. The argument, largely intuitive, is stated as
follows:
It seems obvious, though, that the intent is to ensure that a publicly funded entity be conducted
in a manner such that “everybody” is better off. After all, everybody is paying the entity’s cost.
So when just a relative few are better off, or if those relative few are so much more better off
than everybody else, it makes sense that tax exemption should be denied or withdrawn.
Everybody shouldn’t have to pay when only a few are better off, or when a few are especially
better off. Private benefit is best understood, therefore, as a political doctrine demanding a level
of public equality from publicly funded entities.
Id. at 131. Intuitive though it may be, the argument is not without support in our constitutional system of
government that relies upon “equal protection of the laws” as one of its fundamental principles.
71
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individualized betterment.74 The second question focuses on the economic observation
that the government should not use public funds to subsidize an activity for which there is
a potential profit motivation so that the activity would occur without the subsidy.75 This
second question concentrates on the economic necessity of tax subsidization. If an
activity is imbued with the hope of profit, it might be assumed that the activity will be
provided for in the capitalist marketplace and therefore tax exemption financing is
unnecessary.76 A private betterment is incidental, according to the Service, only when it
is both necessary and not of such a magnitude that it calls into question the legitimacy of
tax exemption. The Service’s analysis provides no indication as to legitimacy of tax
exemption so we are left to speculate, starting from the assumptions and historical
theories underlying charitable tax exemption. But first, with regard to the third
implication of American Campaign Academy, the Service states that unnecessary or
excessive private benefit will preclude tax exemption regardless of the extent to which
the organization is achieving or pursuing the public good in other respects.
¶36
There is a certain level of appeal and even apparent regulatory support for the
American Campaign Academy cost-benefit approach. But the appeal is only superficial
and the regulatory support is questionable at best. A cost benefit, de minimis standard
such as that adopted in American Campaign Academy implies a necessary cost without
which the benefit could not be obtained. Yet the American Campaign Academy approach
applies a de minimis excuse after already determining that the private benefit is in fact
unnecessary.77 So long as an organization is devoting its public subsidy to the public
good for the most part, it may divert an undefined smaller portion of that subsidy, even if
unnecessarily, to private benefit.78 Admittedly, there is apparent, though certainly not
definitive, regulatory support for a cost-benefit approach. The relevant regulations, in
implementing the requirement that charities be “exclusively” operated for an exempt
purpose, allow for a de minimis deviation from that requirement.79 The word
74

Judge Posner, in his opinion in United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r stated the question:
And maybe tax law has a role to play in assuring the prudent management of charities.
Remember the IRS’s alternative basis for yanking [United Cancer Council (“UCC”)]’s
exemption? It is that as a result of the contract’s terms, UCC was not really operated exclusively
for charitable purposes, but rather for the private benefit of W&H as well. Suppose that UCC
was so irresponsibly managed that it paid W&H twice as much for fundraising services as W&H
would have been happy to accept for those services, so that of UCC’s $26 million in fundraising
expense $13 million was the equivalent of a gift to the fundraiser. Then it could be argued that
UCC was in fact being operated to a significant degree for the private benefit of W&H, though
not because it was the latter’s creature. That then would be a route for using tax law to deal with
the problem of improvident or extravagant expenditures by a charitable organization that do not,
however, inure to the benefit of insiders.
165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999). While the excerpt is without question geared towards the financial
appropriateness of the transaction, it does suggest two relevant points. First, that tax law has some role,
undefined as of yet, in the governance of exempt organizations. Second, that directors or trustees of
exempt organizations have an obligation to act with providence vis-à-vis the public trust. To the extent the
public is interested more than just in the financial bona fides of a given transaction, the Service’s rather
provocative analysis (i.e., even a necessary private benefit may be intolerable) seems appropriate.
75
See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) (asserting that
nonprofit organizations exist to cure “market failure”).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990).
79
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2003) requires organizations to operate “exclusively” for exempt purpose. See
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“exclusively” in the statute is defined as “primarily” in the regulations, thus allowing for
insubstantial deviation from a charitable purpose.80 But that deviation does not go
without recompense to the public. Instead, the deviation comes at a cost to the
organization in the form of an unrelated business income tax, and, therefore, the de
minimis allowance pertaining to the exclusivity requirement does not condone an
uncompensated transfer of the tax exemption financing to a private individual.81 The
exception merely acts as a compliment to the unrelated business income tax, allowing an
organization to engage in small amounts of commercial activities with tax subsidized
capital but at the cost of taxable liability.82 The public is therefore compensated for the
deviation. The exception does not logically suggest, as American Campaign Academy
concludes, that the public must accept even a de minimis diversion of the tax subsidy
without recompense.
¶37
American Campaign Academy and GCM 39,862 are consistent, however, in at least
two important respects. First, both the case and the GCM define private benefit as a
relative concept. They both look to whether a select individual or group is particularly
better off relative to the betterment conveyed on the body politic. American Campaign
Academy uses the phrase “advantage, fruit, privilege, gain, or interest” to articulate the
underlying theory.83 That articulation, though, essentially represents a dissimilar list of
words conveying no common meaning.84 But if the phrase is read in conjunction with the
court’s focus on the conferral of some sort of betterment—not necessarily financial—on
“targeted”85 individuals an underlying theory becomes discernable: Public benefit,
following the unorganized reasoning of the tax court, implies a conferral of benefit on the
non-select body politic. The word “non-select” is another strange term the Tax Court
used in American Campaign Academy.86 Private benefit therefore arises when select
identifiable members of the body politic are unnecessarily made comparatively better off
than the body as a whole. GCM 39,862 implicitly and, indeed, necessarily agrees with
this much of American Campaign Academy’s formulation.
¶38
Second, it is instructive to note that neither American Campaign Academy nor
GCM 39,862 involved financially unfair transactions between the exempt organizations
and the private individuals who were determined to have improperly benefited. In fact,
GCM 39,862 explicitly found that the transfers were made for fair market value.87
supra note 47. The regulations, however, require only that an organization operate “primarily” for an
exempt purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990). See also Better Bus. Bureau of
Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) (holding that an organization may deviate
from its exempt purpose(s) only insubstantially and still retain tax exemption).
80
“Exclusively” was first re-written to read “primarily.” Better Bus. Bureau, 369 U.S. at 286.
81
See I.R.C. § 511 (2003) (imposing a tax on the net income derived from trades or business unrelated
to the exempt purpose).
82
In actuality, the allowance of a small deviation from an organization’s exempt purpose preceded
enactment of the unrelated business income tax and therefore could not have been intended to compliment
I.R.C. § 511, though that is its effect today. More likely, the de minimis exception was a judge-made rule
that allowed charitable organizations to engage in small scale economic activity to help fund charitable
activities. See id.
83
92 T.C. at 1065-66 (1989), citing Retired Teachers Legal Fund, Inc. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 280, 286
(1982).
84
Jones, supra note 10, at 132.
85
92 T.C. at 1075.
86
Id. at 1077.
87
The memorandum involved a reconsideration of three prior private letter rulings that approved of
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Financial unfairness may still prove an unnecessary individual betterment, but such
unfairness is not the entire violation. Instead the violation is embodied in allowing a
select individual or group to unnecessarily capture the organization’s “invariable
beneficial ripple effect” for itself. “Invariable beneficial ripple effect” refers to the fact
that a tax-exempt organization exists within a broader economic context and will
necessarily confer valuable benefits on persons not properly within the intended
charitable class.88 To feed hungry people, for example, a soup kitchen must obtain food
and supplies from somewhere. To the extent it purchases those things (using donated
money, for example), it is creating a valuable beneficial ripple effect to commercial
vendors. If the organization unnecessarily purchases all of its food and supplies from a
single vendor, a question arises whether tax exemption financing of that franchise is
appropriate because that single vendor is comparatively better off than the rest of the
public. Thus, GCM 39,862, American Campaign Academy, and other cases and rulings
implicating the private benefit doctrine,89 have focused not on the economic fairness of
the financial transaction, but on whether the transaction or activity unnecessarily placed
select individuals in an advantageous or privileged status relative to the non-select body
politic.
¶39
There are, however, two generic types of cases that seem directly to challenge the
theory of quantitative charity. The first type involves homeowners’ associations, while
the second involves Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”). The homeowners’
challenge is best represented by Columbia Park & Recreation Ass’n v. Commissioner,90
in which the Fourth Circuit confirmed the denial of tax exemption even though the
organization provided municipal services91 to large numbers of persons of different
financial means.92 The organization provided such services to 110,000 people of
differing economic and racial categories. Nevertheless, the Tax Court determined that
the organization conveyed a private benefit because non-members were allowed to use
the services and facilities only on a less advantageous basis than members.93 The
underlying reasoning for the conclusion is somewhat difficult to discern given the large
number of members and the notion that those members would have relied on government
for the same services if the organization did not exist.94 As a matter of private benefit
theory as articulated in this article, the case seems based on the notion that individual
advantage, even one provided to an obviously large group of people, was unnecessary to
benefit the entire body politic—the advantage was not required if the goal was simply to
revenue sharing arrangements. The memorandum stated, with regard to each of the three prior rulings that
the transactions were effectuated under fair financial terms.
88
Jones, supra note 10.
89
See, e.g., Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999); Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm’r,
71 T.C. 202 (1978).
90
88 T.C. 1, 24 (1987), aff’d, 838 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1988).
91
Such services are essentially synonymous to “charity” from a quantitative standpoint because they are
identical to public services provided by governments.
92
The organization was set up to provide municipal services to approximately 110,000 people.
Columbia Park, 88 T.C. at 3-5. The Tax Court noted that the unincorporated area constituted the second
largest population in the State of Maryland and was approximately the size of Manhattan. Id. at 17.
93
Id. at 26.
94
The organization provided such services as public transportation, parks, after-school care, community
centers and a host of other quality of life services one might find in any incorporated municipality. Id. at 56.
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benefit the public by alleviating some of the burden that would otherwise be felt by
government. The organization provided municipal-type services analogous to those
presumptively viewed as qualitatively charitable95 and in doing so it provided a benefit to
the public whose official governments were relieved of the necessity of otherwise doing
so.96 The Court noted, though, that the “community benefit” could be achieved without
providing advantages to the members (as compared to non-members) of the
unincorporated area. The argument does not seem completely unreasonable, though
neither is it entirely satisfactory. The answer apparently lies in the notion that tax
exemption financing must be dispersed in a nondiscriminatory fashion, unless there is a
necessity for doing otherwise. The use of different price and priority systems with
respect to the organization’s goods and services, one for members and another for nonmembers,97 indicated the conveyance of an advantage to certain individuals comprising
the body politic. Without a showing of necessity, the advantage provided to members
constituted private benefit.98
¶40
The HMO challenge to a qualitative definition of private benefit is best presented
by Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner.99 In Geisinger Health Plan, the Third Circuit
denied tax exemption to a health maintenance organization despite the HMO’s indirect
provision of health care (a presumptive public good since at least 1954) to large numbers
of financially diverse people who paid membership dues.100 Again, the reasoning with
respect to the private benefit doctrine is difficult to discern. As in Columbia Park &
Recreation Ass’n, however, there was differential treatment between members and
nonmembers because in Geisinger Health Plan nonmembers were not entitled to the
organization’s services on any basis.101 The Tax Court’s somewhat unsatisfactory
reasoning was that the advantage granted to members was unnecessary if the goal was to
provide health care to the public.102 Regardless, the application of the private benefit
doctrine seemed inappropriate given the large number of people served in both cases, but
ultimately justifiable on the basis that tax exemption financing is inconsistent with
unnecessary differential treatment within the body politic.
¶41
This article has used the phrase, “body politic” quite intentionally. If, as has
already been argued, private benefit is not merely a financial matter, then it must relate to
another societal value. The notion of equity in the tax code suggests that taxation and its
95

Id.
Curiously, the Tax Court noted that the organization operated like a city and indeed could obtain tax
exemption by incorporating as such, but rejected the idea that the organization assisted in relieving
government burdens. Id. at 20-21.
97
Id. at 8 (referring to the lower fees charged to members than those charged to non-members).
98
The Tax Court stated:
Were petitioner operating primarily for a public rather than private interest, the people financing
its operation would not have a right, based upon property ownership, to receive the benefits it
offers. On the contrary, once financed, petitioner would offer its facilities and service programs
primarily to those in need regardless of their place of residence. Unlike the instant case, no quid
pro quo exists in an organization that is operating primarily for a public purpose.
Id. at 19.
99
985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
100
Id. at 1212-13.
101
Id. at 1219 (“The test remains one of community benefit, and GHP cannot demonstrate that it
benefits anyone but its subscribers.”)
102
Id. at 1219-20.
96
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opposite, tax exemption, is as much a political construct as it is an economic construct.103
The economic view is that tax exemption is necessary to obtain a public good for which
there is no economic incentive from which to expect that the good will be provided in the
marketplace.104 The political view holds that charitable tax exemption contributes to and
is inherent in the uniquely American democratic society—one based on notions of
equality and equal protection.105 It provides for the diversity of influence and voices in
the broad tapestry of American democracy.106 It does so by empowering those voices
that, for whatever reason, are diminished or shut out of the more formal democratic
process. For example, when the majority of society excludes or marginalizes views
relating to feminism, charitable tax exemption provides for an alternative financial means
for those issues to be explored and discussed under the conclusion that even presently
disfavored views may ultimately work for the betterment of the body politic.107 This
political basis of tax exemption, therefore, is necessarily premised on tax exemption
financing not being diverted to individual gain without justification. To do so is to
exacerbate rather than alleviate political inequalities. The political legitimacy of tax
exemption fades to the extent charitable exemption is diverted to unnecessary private
advantage, since doing so runs counter to equal treatment amongst the public. The
private benefit doctrine, then, theorized as a political principle, can be useful in enforcing
a fundamental characteristic of charitable tax exemption: charitable tax exemption is
appropriate when “everybody” benefits in roughly equal proportion. When only a select
few benefit, or when a select few benefit especially, it becomes appropriate to raise the
political science question as to the appropriateness of tax exemption. The essential point
is that the body politic should financially support an activity only when the activity is
intended to provide benefit exclusively to the body politic.
¶42
This essential requirement—exclusive public betterment—informs the further
analysis. Since it is impossible to achieve public good without consequently benefiting
individuals, it is necessary to determine the acceptable level of inevitable individual
betterment (i.e., the degree of individual betterment necessary to accomplish the public
good). Private benefit ought to deny tax exemption when individual betterment exceeds
that necessary level. It is here that American Campaign Academy and GCM 39,862
dramatically differ. As noted earlier, American Campaign Academy views any and all
individual betterment prerequisite to achieving public good as “incidental” and therefore
consistent with tax exemption.108 If individual betterment, to whatever degree, is
inevitably necessary to achieve public good it should be tolerated. This conclusion is
where the American Campaign Academy analysis ends. The view expressed in GCM
39,862 asks the same question but it takes the analysis one step further. According to
103

See, e.g., Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. U.S., 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declaring Treasury
Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959) unconstitutional because of its impact on the First Amendment
right of free speech).
104
See Hansmann, supra note 23, at 843-45.
105
For a concise discussion of the political underpinnings of the charitable tax exemption, see BRUCE R.
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 11-18 (7th ed. 1998).
106
On two occasions, the Supreme Court has noted the political underpinnings of charitable tax
exemption. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J.
concurring); Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574, 609-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
107
Cf. Big Mama Rag, Inc., 631 F.2d at 1030.
108
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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GCM 39,862, inevitable individual betterment is incidental only if it is necessary to
achieve some public good and is not so great as to raise further questions as to the
legitimacy of tax exemption. An individual betterment may be unavoidable but still not
non-incidental if it is too much to tolerate. GCM 39,862 however, gives no hint as to
how to determine whether that necessary individual betterment is too much to tolerate.
¶43
Relying on the economic and political considerations relevant to tax exemption
financing, it might be speculated that GCM 39,862 is asking whether whatever public
good obtained is really worth the individual betterment. Economic theory implies that
tax exemption-financing is unnecessary when there is sufficient profit potential to assume
that the public good will occur in the economic marketplace.109 Political theory related to
tax exemption-financing suggests that tax exemption is illegitimate when it merely
exacerbates the suppression of disfavored speech.110 Whether private betterment is too
much to tolerate might logically be answered by reference to those two speculations,
since the rules relating to tax exemption are presumably designed to enforce the
conditions underlying tax exemptions in the first place. However needed to accomplish
the public good, tax exemption-financing, should be withheld when the public good can
be obtained without doing violence to economic and political considerations underlying
tax exemption. The presence of individual advantage or privilege, to use the language of
American Campaign Academy,111 such that individuals might undertake to accomplish the
public good without tax exemption financing, is a strong indication that such financing is
inappropriate from both an economic and political standpoint.
¶44
Before proceeding, it is helpful to summarize the conclusions thus far by reference
to the article’s previous contextual examples. When the University of Florida granted
exclusive license in Gatorade to Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., it placed select individuals (the
shareholders of Stokley-Van Camp) in a privileged or advantageous position relative to
the relationship of the body politic with a tax exempt organization.112 Likewise, when the
University of Minnesota or the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation granted
exclusive rights to stem cell technology to private commercial entities, those exempt
organizations granted an advantage or privilege to select individuals with regard to tax
subsidized technology.113 It does not matter whether the select individuals paid fair
market value since they are in a privileged status relative to the body politic. What
matters is whether the grant is necessary to the accomplishment of a public benefit for
which tax exemption-financing is granted. The question is whether individual betterment
is necessary to achieve the public good. The exempt organizations in each instance could
reasonably and logically assert that providing the exclusive license was necessary to
ensure the diffusion of new technology into society.
¶45
Indeed, there is explicit regulatory support for that assertion. The regulatory
definition of exempt scientific organizations contains a particularized application of the
private benefit doctrine to technology transfer. It begins by asserting that scientific
organizations must be operated in the public, rather than private interest.114 It further
109
110
111
112
113
114

See Hansmann, supra note 23, at 843-45.
See supra notes 103, 105-106.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(i) (as amended in 1990).
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states that a sponsor115 may obtain ownership or control of technology that arises from the
sponsored research.116 The scientific organization will not be viewed as operating for
private benefit even though the sponsor gains an advantage or privilege vis-à-vis the taxexempt scientific organization, and relative to the body politic. The apparent
justification—one actually offered by at least one of the exempt organizations in our
contextual examples117—is that the new technology may never have been obtained or
made available to the public but for the incentive embodied in the potential for private
ownership and exploitation. This is undoubtedly an expression that individual advantage
or privilege—i.e., profit—is necessary to accomplish the public good. The point is even
more explicitly stated when the regulations condone the granting of exclusive rights in
tax subsidized technology if such a grant “is the only practicable manner” to make the
technology available to the public.118 Thus, in at least one instance, the regulations
support the argument that individual advantage arising from the transfer of an exclusive
license is indeed “incidental” and therefore consistent with tax exemption when and to
the extent individual advantage is necessary to accomplish the public good. Curiously,
the technology transfer regulations provide a particular application of a private benefit
rule that is never generally stated elsewhere in the regulations.
¶46
By leaving the matter at whether exclusive rights are “necessary,” without further
inquiry into appropriateness, the regulations lend support to the American Campaign
Academy approach. The regulations suggest that necessary private betterment, regardless
of how significant, is consistent with tax exemption. Thus, the transfer of Gatorade or
stem cell technology was and is consistent with tax exemption financing without further
inquiry.119 American Campaign Academy’s failure to inquire further represents the
ultimately irreconcilable difference between the private benefit doctrine as expressed in
American Campaign Academy and in GCM 39,862. The latter would not end its analysis
simply by asking whether an exclusivity arrangement is a necessary means of getting the
technology to the public. Assuming an exclusive license is necessary, it would also ask
whether the public good justifies the resulting individual advantage or privilege. If
exclusive licensing were not actually necessary, GCM 39,862 would deny tax exemption
even if organizations were achieving significant public good in all their other activities.
The American Campaign Academy approach, with at least arguable regulatory support,
would allow unnecessary private benefit if the organizations were achieving much more
public benefit in its other endeavors.
¶47
The GCM 39,862 approach to completely deny tax exemption-financing, even for
insignificant amounts of private benefit, seems miserly at first. If an organization is
achieving public benefit in the overwhelming majority of its activities, it might be
unreasonable and ultimately harmful to the public good to deny or revoke its tax
exemption because of relatively small private benefit. This assertion does not really
object to a rule prohibiting even de minimis private benefit. Instead, it questions the

115

A sponsor is an individual or entity that provides grant funds for research.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(iii)(4).
117
The University of Minnesota justified granting exclusive rights to adult stem cells to Athersys, Inc.
by noting that nonexclusive license do not attract corporate interest and thus impede the transfer of the
technology to the public. See Pollack, supra note 19.
118
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(iv)(b) (2003).
119
This assumes, for the moment, that exclusivity is necessary to achieve public benefit.
116
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appropriateness of the complete revocation sanction.120 A lesser sanction, one designed
to recoup from the organization or more effectively the privately benefited individual an
amount roughly equal to the diverted tax subsidy, would be possible and appropriate.121
Such an intermediate approach is normative in tax exemption jurisprudence.122 The
choice is therefore between the falsely reasonable approach of American Campaign
Academy and the apparently miserly approach of GCM 39,862. A workable mechanism
exists by which to enforce the social and political underpinnings of private benefit
without harming charitable beneficiaries. If it is assumed that American Campaign
Academy abhors private benefit but allows for a cost-benefit exception only because it
does not wish to harm beneficiaries, it might also be assumed that American Campaign
Academy would prohibit even insignificant private benefit when doing so would not harm
beneficiaries. An enforcement mechanism that avoids that harm would therefore render
the American Campaign Academy and GCM 39,862 more consistent.
¶48
It should also be noted that to the extent GCM 39,862 recognizes the necessity of
some individual advantage, it is consistent with a demonstrably more considered
approach to restricting the use of tax exemption financing to public rather than private
benefit. With regard to tax exempt bond financing, the “private business use”123 rules
clearly express that tax exemption financing is inappropriate to the extent such financing
results in an advantage for select individuals rather than the body politic.124 At the same
time, the rules—stated in I.R.C. § 140 to § 145 and their corresponding detailed
regulations—contain an objective formula by which to determine the limits of necessary
individual advantage or privilege. The objective formula essentially determines that
individual advantage is intolerable when more than ten percent of the proceeds from taxexempt bonds are diverted to individual use.125 The tax-exempt bond rules also provide a
list of objectively defined exceptions which essentially allow for increased private
business use when the private use is necessary to achieve the public benefit.126 Even
then, there are limits on the amount of necessary private business use that is tolerable.127
This is to say that under the tax-exempt bond financing regulations, there comes a point
when even necessary individual benefit is too much to tolerate. Although attractive and
easy to apply, the same formula is unavailable to tax exemption-financing because it is
near impossible to quantify the value of tax exemption’s financial benefit to any
particular entity,128 and even more difficult to determine its value when diverted to
individual advantage or privilege. With tax-exempt bond financing, it is merely a matter
120

The economic and political theory underlying the insistence on exclusive public benefit should be
enforced, assuming those theories are deemed sufficiently important, but enforcement does not necessarily
require revocation of tax exemption (i.e., proverbially “throwing the baby out with the bathwater”).
121
Cf. I.R.C. § 4958 (2003) (providing for “intermediate sanction” for violations of the private
inurement prohibition).
122
See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4941–4945 (2003) (imposing a series of graduated excise taxes on private
foundations that engage in transactions deemed inconsistent with tax exemption).
123
I.R.C. § 141(b) (2003).
124
I.R.C. § 141(b)(6) (defining private business use as use of tax exempt proceeds by any private
person).
125
I.R.C. 141(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.141-3 (as amended in 2001).
126
See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.141-3(c)-(d) (as amended in 2001).
127
Id.
128
The amount of tax exemption benefit in any case depends upon the amount of revenues generated by
a tax exempt organization.
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of determining the proceeds from the bond issuance and then taking ten percent of that
amount as the private benefit limit. Nevertheless, GCM 39,862 is consistent with the
apparently agreed upon Congressional and Executive policy on the derivation of private
benefits from tax-exempt bond financing proceeds.
¶49
The remaining issue separating American Campaign Academy and GCM 39,862 is
whether private betterment is automatically consistent with tax exemption even if the
private benefit is of a very high magnitude. Neither American Campaign Academy nor
the technology transfer regulations asks that question, while GCM 39,862 requires that
the question be asked without guidance as to how it ought to be answered. One can only
speculate to the appropriate answer, taking into account economic, political, and social
concerns relevant to tax exemption-financing. Economically, tax subsidization is
unnecessary to the extent that a public good is associated with or may generate significant
individual betterment. When private betterment is significant,129 it can reasonably be
argued that the profit potential inherent in the activity is sufficient to cause the activity’s
occurrence without tax subsidy. The political consideration relates to democratic ideals
underlying the grant of tax exemption. Achieving the public good necessarily requires
seemingly discriminatory private betterment. There comes a point, however, when
accomplishment of the public good becomes a negative-sum gain. When private
betterment becomes so excessive that it sacrifices democratic ideals, it is legitimate to
question whether the harm outweighs whatever public good is sought. At some point, the
necessary private betterment is not worth eroding the democratic ideal.
¶50
The social consideration has not been previously explored. The social consideration
relates to the use to which a select individual will put the tax exempt advantage or
privilege. That use may be so recognizably inconsistent with the broadly defined public
good that the grant of exclusive license is socially illegitimate in light of the tax
exemption-financing. In other words, it may be consistent with the public good in any
particular case that technology be reserved for use by one commercial entity, but the
particular recipient may be unsuitable to the sought-after public good because of an
inability or unwillingness to further the good in a manner not recognizably harmful to the
public good. Suppose, for example, that a license recipient insisted on the rights to any
derivative technology and, because of commercial concerns, sought to prevent the
diffusion of the derivative technology derived from tax exemption-financing. In that
instance, social policy might dictate that the technology not be exclusively entrusted to
the single commercial actor. Thus, economic, political, and social considerations are
relevant and helpful as to whether and what extent a public good justifies a necessary
private betterment. These considerations are implicit in the GCM 39,862 formulation of
private benefit but are never raised in the American Campaign Academy formulation or in
the technology transfer regulations.
¶51
The irreconcilable difference between these formulations requires a selection and
defense of one approach over the other. The ‘Brave New World’, in which private
benefit is to be applied, requires the GCM 39,862 approach. Before defending this
choice of analysis, it is helpful to clearly restate and refine the approach in the form of a
proposed regulation. The following Restatement of the approach articulates the rule
derived from the above discussion and then provides examples, proceeding from
129
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contemporary issues to more difficult contextual issues related to health care and
technology transfer.130 Thereafter, this article responds to some of the most obvious
criticisms.
IV. RESTATING THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE
Proposed Private Benefit Regulation131

¶52

1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i): A tax-exempt organization must benefit the public
exclusively and may not convey a private benefit. Thus, an organization
must not provide an unnecessary advantage to any individual, entity, or
group (hereinafter referred to as “individual”). Except as provided in
subparagraph (ii), such an advantage results in and constitutes private
benefit.
(a) An organization conveys an advantage when it provides greater access
to its goods, services, or assets for any individual than it does for the nonselect general public. For this purpose, it is irrelevant that the individual
pays a fair price for the greater access.
(b) The term “greater access” includes an exclusive license, a franchise, or
other similar priority right enforceable against individuals not granted
such rights, or the entity itself.
(c) An organization does not convey an advantage merely because it
makes its goods, services, or assets available to any and all customers
willing to pay a fee or cost therefore.
(ii) Private benefit does not result if the organization conveys an
advantage to any individual under the following conditions:
(a) The public benefit to be achieved thereby is within the purpose for
which exemption is granted or asserted,
(b) The public benefit cannot reasonably be achieved without conveying
the advantage, and
(c) The advantage is insubstantial when viewed in relation to the public
benefit sought by the activity that conveys the advantage.
130

This Restatement is a refinement of a proposal I have previously put forth. See supra note 10, at
138. I have included examples in this refinement at the suggestion of an anonymous peer reviewer to
whom I am grateful.
131
The present edition of Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii) is most often cited as the regulatory
source of the private benefit doctrine. See supra note 57. But as noted, that regulation merely restates the
axiomatic proposition that charitable tax exemption is appropriate only when the public benefits. Id. The
proposed regulation would replace the present version and is intended to provide a method of analysis by
which to determine the public good.
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(iii) An organization that engages in private benefit violates this section
and I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) even though, as an overall matter, the organization
is operated primarily for exempt purposes.
(iv) Examples. The following examples demonstrate the principles of this
section:
(1) Foodbank, an organization exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides
free food and shelter for approximately 3000 homeless persons per day. It
also operates a small bed and breakfast that provides food and shelter to
any and all paying customers. Foodbank enters into an agreement with
Wholesaler to purchase all of its foodstuffs (other than those it receives via
in-kind donations); sales to Foodbank constitute five percent of
Wholesaler’s annual sales. Wholesaler, in exchange for the exclusive
arrangement under which Foodbank will purchase all of its food from
Wholesaler, sells food to Foodbank at cost and well below market rates.
In the absence of the exclusive arrangement, Foodbank would only be able
to provide meals for less than one half the persons it presently serves.
Wholesaler is in an advantageous position with regard to Foodbank and
relative to the general public. Nevertheless, since Foodbank can show that
its ability to accomplish its charitable goal would be significantly thwarted
without the advantage conveyed to Wholesaler, the advantage will not
constitute private benefit. In addition, although the operation of the bed
and breakfast may constitute an unrelated trade or business subject to
taxation under I.R.C. § 511, it does not convey an individual, tax
exemption-financed advantage. Operation of the bed and breakfast does
not constitute private benefit because the only limitation on the use of the
bed and breakfast is the requirement that users pay for the services.
(2) Karla’s Winter Clothing Club operates a state authorized game of
chance the proceeds from which are exclusively used to provide winter
coats and clothing for poor families, a charitable purpose recognized under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Participants buy “tokens” containing numbers and at
the end of each week, organizers draw a number. The participant with the
number matching the number drawn wins a small cash prize, usually
representing approximately fifteen percent of the total amount paid for all
tokens during the week. Tokens may be purchased only from a single
location owned by Food and Cold Libations, L.L.C., a local bar and grill.
Food and Cold Libations’ owners organized Karla’s Winter Clothing
Club, but no longer serve in any capacity with respect thereto. Most of the
tokens are purchased by Food and Cold Libations customers, though
participants may purchase tokens without ordering food or drinks. All the
advertisements seeking participants in Karla’s Winter Clothing Club
contain some reference to Food and Cold Libations, either as the single
location from which tokens may be purchased, or as the original sponsor
of the effort to provide winter clothes for poor families. Some
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advertisements merely depict Food and Cold Libations’ restaurant in the
background while others explicitly refer to the restaurant as the place from
which tokens may be purchased. Food and Cold Libations stands in an
advantageous relationship with respect to Karla’s Winter Clothing Club
and relative to the general public. Since the advantage conveyed is
unnecessary to the accomplishment of the exempt purpose, Karla’s Winter
Clothing Club is operated for private benefit.132
(3) Home Association provides municipal-type services for its 7000
members, all of whom are and must be homeowners in an unincorporated
area adjacent to City. City’s population is approximately 57,000. Home
Association claims exemption as an organization dedicated to lessening
community tensions and combating community deterioration. Municipal
services include maintenance of recreation facilities (swimming pools,
tennis and golf courses, health facilities, and parks), erecting and
maintaining street signs, and providing security for the area. Homeowners
are entitled to use the recreation facilities at a fee sufficient to cover
operating costs, while non-homeowners may use the facilities on a space
available basis (i.e., if homeowners are not using the facilities) and only
after payment of a higher fee. Because the organization’s goods, services,
or assets are made available to homeowners at preferential rates (providing
an advantage to select individuals), the organization provides a private
benefit and should be denied tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The
size of the group supports an argument that “the public” is exclusively
benefited, but the benefit is dispersed in a discriminatory manner.133
(4) HMO is an organization that arranges for health care services for its
dues-paying members. Membership is open to any person or group able to
pay the membership dues and HMO maintains a financial aid program to
assist persons unable to pay the dues. HMO does not provide medical
services itself but arranges, via capitation agreements with independent
providers, for the provision of such services to its members. HMO’s
financial aid program helps more than 200 individuals and families, who
would otherwise be unable to afford the dues, obtain health care from
HMO’s contracted health care providers. Since the only requirement for
access to HMO’s services is the payment of dues, the organization is not
conveying a private benefit. It may be, however, that the HMO’s failure
to directly provide free or indigent care, or otherwise engage in qualitative
charitable activities, prevents the conclusion that HMO is operating for a
charitable purpose.
(5) University is recognized as tax exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). It
enters into a contract with Soft Drink under which Soft Drink obtains
132

This example is based on the facts in KJ’s Fund Raisers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 669
(1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 1200 (1998).
133
This example is based on Columbia Park & Recreation Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1 (1987).
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exclusive rights to sell its beverages at athletic events conducted by
University. Soft Drink compensates University via a royalty of X percent
of gross sales revenue. The amateur athletic events are exempt functions
and the sale of soft drinks on an exclusive basis is customary and
convenient to the conduct of athletic events, whether amateur or
otherwise. Since the granting of exclusive pouring rights is a customary
business practice related to the conduct of athletic events, it may be
presumed that the advantage to Soft Drink is necessary to the
accomplishment of an exempt purpose and does not constitute a private
benefit. The presumption may be overcome by showing that the royalty
paid to the University is substantially less than fair market value, or that
the grant of exclusive rights is manifestly inconsistent with the public
good under the particular facts and circumstances. It is appropriate in this
and all other examples to look to non-tax policy considerations such as the
appropriateness of allowing commercial influence in amateur athletic
events.134 Whether such exclusive pouring rights results in unrelated
business taxable income is to be determined under I.R.C. § 511.
(6) Cancer Institute, an organization recognized as exempt under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3), seeks new treatments for cancer. On January 1, it enters into an
exclusive agreement with a commercial fundraising organization,
Fundraiser. The agreement provides that Fundraiser shall be paid an
amount equal to ten percent of all monies raised and be reimbursed for
mailings and other reasonable expenses. During the year, Fundraiser
raises $1,000,000 from gifts and donations made to Cancer Institute. After
deduction of its fee and reimbursement for its reasonable expenses,
Fundraiser remits $175,000 to Cancer Institute. Fundraiser is an
individual that enjoys an advantage or privilege relative to Cancer
Institute. Although raising funds is necessary to the accomplishment of
the charitable goal, the public good accomplished by the fundraising
activity is too insignificant, relative to the private betterment, to justify
continued tax exemption. Of the $1,000,000 raised on behalf of Cancer
Institute, only $175,000 went to the accomplishment of the purpose for
which exemption is asserted. The advantage conveyed to Fundraiser is too
great in comparison to the benefit conveyed on the general public. The
conclusion would apply even if Cancer Institute engaged in several other
activities, none of which conveyed a private benefit.135
(7) Hospital is recognized as tax exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). It relies
on gifts, grants, donations and income from paying patients to provide free
health care for indigent and uninsured patients. Due to factors relating to
the emergence of managed care and the increased commercialization of
health care (including the presence of increased profit-making physician

134
135
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practice groups), Hospital’s paying customer base has decreased to such
an extent that it has been forced to substantially decrease or eliminate the
amount of free health care it provides. To reverse this trend, Hospital
enters into a joint venture with a for-profit hospital on commercially
reasonable terms. A consortium of physician practice groups owns the
for-profit hospital. The joint venture agreement provides that the Hospital
will conduct all of its health care in conjunction with the for-profit
hospital, except when neither partner offers the necessary health care
service or possesses the required expertise. The physician practice group
constitutes an ‘individual,’ which, by virtue of the joint venture
agreement, is granted an advantage, relative to Hospital, greater than that
enjoyed by the general public. Since Hospital can show by objective and
verifiable evidence that the joint venture is necessary for the provision of
indigent care and that such joint venture activities are neither unreasonable
nor imprudent in the prevailing business context (i.e., ordinary and
customary in the health care industry) it may be presumed that hospital is
not operating for private benefit. The presumption may be overcome by
the presence of facts and circumstances indicating that the joint venture
provides more advantages to the physician practice group than are
necessary to the accomplishment of the charitable goal or that earnings
derived by the physician group partners exceed those available to
physician group partners in a joint venture not involving a tax-exempt
health care organization. The same analysis would apply if hospital
entered into a joint venture agreement with regard to only a few of its
available services. Although the hospital will not be operated for private
benefit, assuming it presents adequate evidence of necessity, the terms of
the joint venture agreement may support the conclusion that it is not
organized for an exempt purpose.136
(8) Research Organization is recognized as tax exempt under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3). It engages in both independent and sponsored research as part
of its charitable goal. Research Organization develops a “performance
enhancing” soft drink and grants an exclusive license to a commercial
food and drink manufacturer. It also enters into a sponsored research
agreement for the development of revolutionary genetic technology that
can produce new human organs and perhaps whole new human beings.
The sponsor is granted the exclusive rights in the resulting technology. It
is normal and customary that new technology be made available to the
public via exclusive licenses because nonexclusive licenses decreases the
chances that commercial providers will recoup the significant costs
incurred in marketing new technology. Thus, it may be presumed that the
grant of exclusive licenses in technologies developed by Research
Organization does not constitute private benefit. The presumption must
give way, however, in the presence of other factors indicating harm to the
136

See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
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public interest. Factors to be considered include the length and scope of
the license. For example a broader exclusive license that includes both
research and commercial uses of the technology is more likely to be
consistent with the public interest when granted for relatively short periods
of time. A nonexclusive license will normally not be contrary to the
public interest. Likewise, the presumption might be overcome in the face
of evidence that the organization has not taken sufficient steps to ensure
the license is appropriately granted, and that the technologies will be made
available to the public in a reasonable time in light of the prevailing
commercial circumstances. Such steps depend on the nature and
importance of the technology and may include terms in the licensing
agreement akin to “march-in rights” under the Bayh-Dole Act137 if the
licensee fails to use or implement the technology within a reasonable time
period taking into account applicable and relevant circumstances, the
nature, importance and risks associated with the technology and other
considerations not related solely to the maximization of profit. In any
event, the considerations to be taken into account include those evolving
and emerging standards of a civilized society.
¶53

The goal of any formal articulation of legal doctrine is to capture and
understandably convey the principles deemed important enough to mandate via
governmental authority. Throughout the discussion, this article has assumed that tax
exemption is premised on the absence of individual advantage138 and the presence of
purely public benefit. Yet logic shows that public benefit cannot be achieved without
individual gain since the public is merely an aggregation of individuals. This article has
noted also that public financing such as that embodied in tax exemption is necessarily
imbued with political notions of equality. The proceeds from taxation and likewise tax
exemption ought to be dispersed as equally as possible throughout body politic. Tax
exemption is thus inconsistent with special advantage (as is demonstrated in the proposed
137

35 U.S.C. 203 (2002). The Act provides:
(a) With respect to any subject invention in which a small business firm or nonprofit
organization has acquired title under this chapter , the Federal agency under whose funding
agreement the subject invention was made shall have the right, in accordance with such
procedures as are provided in regulations promulgated hereunder to require the contractor, an
assignee or exclusive licensee of a subject invention to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive,
or exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible applicant or applicants, upon terms that
are reasonable under the circumstances, and if the contractor, assignee, or exclusive licensee
refuses such request, to grant such a license itself, if the Federal agency determines that such—
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to
take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject
invention in such field of use;
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by
the contractor, assignee, or their licensees;
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations and
such requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or
(4) action is necessary because the agreement required by section 204 has not been obtained or
waived or because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the
United States is in breach of its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204.
138
Individual advantage has been broadly defined to include more than monetary increase.
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Restatement). In blackletter terms, private benefit requires (1) the grant of a
“franchise”—explicitly or implicitly—with respect to a primary or secondary ripple
effect that is either (2) unnecessary to the accomplishment of a public benefit deemed
qualitatively worthy of tax exemption or (3) too significant relative to the public benefit
derived solely from the activity. The Restatement refers to the franchise (implying some
exclusivity relative to the general public), as an “advantage.” For this reason, the mere
fact that tax exemption financed goods or services are made available to the purchasing
public is insufficient to create private benefit, though the entity may be otherwise
disqualified from tax exemption. If anybody can purchase the goods or services there is
no franchise. Example 4 in the proposed Restatement demonstrates this principle.
Examples 1, 3, and 5 through 8 involve explicit franchises, while Example 2 involves an
implicit franchise. Those examples proceed to analyze the second and third blackletter
factors mentioned above to conclude that private benefit is or is not present. In doing so,
they apply the previously identified fundamental principles deemed important enough to
articulate a distinct legal doctrine.
¶54
There are quite naturally various points of criticisms with regard to the proposed
Restatement. First and foremost is the notion that “too much” private betterment should
preclude tax exemption. The standard begs the question, “how much is too much?” For
some, answering that question by making references to the particular facts and
circumstances is clearly unsatisfactory.139 The unsatisfactory feeling results from the
instinct for definitive outcomes about which there is little or no reasonable disagreement.
The same criticism and unsatisfactory feeling is also provoked by the suggestion that
private benefit requires a weighing of economic, social and political considerations. That
too begs the question as to whose judgment is to prevail. Any standard that seeks to
accommodate human complexity and the desire for pluralism brings with it subjectivities
that are the source of uncertainty. The Restatement, however, seems to be almost
exclusively subjective in this regard.
¶55
The Restatement’s subjectivity is not just a matter of necessity. It is also a matter
of intentional preference. Certainly no standard can account for human complexities and
diversities but, even if it were possible to eliminate subjectivity in the Restatement, it
would not be wise to do so. A demand for certainty of that sort admits of a fundamental
misunderstanding of the charitable sector. A completely objective standard implies a
level of regularity to which all actors within the charitable sector must ascribe. But the
fundamental essence of the charitable sector is nonconformity—a characteristic that helps
maintain a diversity of social and political existence and the lack of which created the
absurdity in Huxley’s Brave New World.140
¶56
From a social standpoint, charitable organizations are similar to each other only to
the extent that they all contrary to economic or political norms. Indeed, the charitable
sector’s contribution to society is embodied in its contrary instincts. Charities
instinctively choose different paths from those taken by the political and business sectors
and from other charities. A consideration of the body of tax law related to charities
would thus reveal no single identifiable characteristic or methodology other than those
139
Judge Posner’s retort to counsel in United Cancer Council that a facts and circumstances approach is
“no standard at all” is therefore manifestly wrong at least in the area of tax exemption jurisprudence. 165
F.3d at 1179. As I explain in the text, a facts and circumstances approach is a standard at the extreme.
140
HUXLEY, supra note 1.
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related to the fundamental assumptions of tax exemption (no individual wealth and
exclusive public betterment). Beyond these assumptions, charities are left to define the
public good themselves, and to determine the best method of achieving their own
definition of that good.
¶57
Subjectivity, even to an extreme degree, is consistent with the essential
characteristic of charitable organizations. Objectivity, particularly in an attempt to
standardize the definition of “public benefit,” would interfere with the value of diversity
and pluralism in determining the public good. It should be noted here that this discussion
is moving from the primary concern of the private benefit doctrine—defining charity
from a quantitative standpoint—to the broader concern defining charity from a qualitative
standpoint. Exemption in Example 4 of the proposed Restatement is not denied because
of quantitative concerns—rather it is because what the entity is doing is not a qualitative
good worthy of tax exemption. Once the private benefit doctrine asks whether the private
advantage is too great, it begins an overlap into notions of the quantitative question of
charity. Admitting that does not detract from the articulated standard, it merely confirms
that the whole of tax exemption is intertwined. The point, nevertheless, is that a single,
clearly objective standard of public good would eviscerate the democratic ideals that
underlie the grant of tax exemption—to a greater degree than would any subjective
standard.
¶58
If it is indeed preferable that private benefit be defined and determined by each
individual charity, then it makes sense to question the need for a private benefit standard
at all. Why should intellectual energy be expended articulating a seemingly
unenforceable standard? The question is legitimate enough, but a subjective standard is
not entirely unenforceable. A subjective standard is enforceable even if only at the
extremes. A subjective standard allows for the diversity of viewpoints that is essential to
and characteristic of the charitable sector and, at the same time, it allows for majority
oversight at the very extremes. Charities can make a reasonable, if arguable,
determination regarding the public good, but when that determination becomes
extreme—defined as universally, or nearly universally objectionable—a subjective
standard allows for the imposition of majority control and oversight. There is and ought
to be a wide, tolerable variation with regard to public benefit; a subjective standard
recognizes that variation. However, the variable scope is not without limitations. In the
absence of even a subjective standard there would be no extreme boundary.
¶59
The value in encouraging alternative visions of the public good, while also setting
extreme limits, supports a subjective, process-oriented standard. An objective standard
would be more appropriate if society wanted to dictate a certain identifiable method or
result in every case. But the charitable sector is valuable precisely because it allows for
experimentation with regard to methods and results. A subjective standard therefore
allows for experimentation, but also sets forth the factors and processes that ought to
inform each charity’s determination of the public good. The law does not (and could not)
dictate a certain result with regard to determination of public benefit. Yet it is neither
unreasonable nor impractical that the law require that each charity consider a universal
set of factors—necessity as regards the grant of an advantage, as well as economic,
social, and political ideas. While the imposition of a sort of due diligence cannot
guarantee that a charity will always come to a universally agreed upon determination of
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public benefit, it can—like any due diligence standard—dramatically decrease the
likelihood that a charity’s determination will be manifestly unacceptable.
¶60
The notion that the tax standards imposed on charities are voluntary is implicit in
the preceding discussion. Some might object to this admission, but such voluntary
standards in the Tax Code are neither surprising nor unusual, since the Code generally
relies on self-compliance for its effectiveness. Hence, tax law is very often more
aspirational than self–enforcing, despite being written in mandatory terms. Aspirational,
difficult-to-enforce standards are even more appropriate to a societal sector that views
itself as “do-gooders.”141 Hence, the proposed Restatement provides guidance on the
assumption that charities will look to and apply that guidance in good faith. Clearly, this
standard is preferable to one that imposes a definite methodology and result on a sector
whose value lies in its experimental, contrary diversity.
V.

CONCLUSION

¶61

This article is not about technology transfer per se. It is about the legal rules that
ensure the best use of publicly-financed technology. The present-day potential effect of
technology transfer on the public good is undoubtedly a catalyst for change and
improvement in many areas of law. Tax exemption jurisprudence is no exception.
Advances in technology, particularly advances developed via tax exemption-financing
mandate restatements in potentially outdated Twentieth Century legal principles. The
goal is to insure that outcomes, even if they remain the same in the Twenty-first Century,
are nevertheless beneficial to society.
¶62
It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that the resolution of the private benefit
doctrine in this article would not prevent the granting of an exclusive license to Gatorade
or even the more crucial technology arising from stem cell research. Granting exclusive
private ownership to public goods is not the harm with which this article is concerned,
however. Enforcing the public good is not a matter of prohibiting any particular end
result, because the “public good” is not a concept that can or should be standardized.
Instead, the Harm is the lack of logically articulated standards by which to consider
whether an end result is consistent with the public good. It may indeed be the rare
exception that the lack of standards actually results in Harm. In rare occasions, however,
the Harm might be catastrophic. The chance of Harm increases as exempt organizations
are entrusted with increasingly more important tax exemption-financed assets with
unlimited promise, such as stem cell research products.
¶63
Historically, exclusive licensing of tax-subsidized technology has been the default
approach. Perhaps that approach should continue to apply, particularly in a society that
views profit potential as the best means to provide goods and services to society.
Granting exclusive license to a soft drink formula, however, is substantially far less
momentous than granting exclusive license to technology relating to the creation and
maintenance of life itself. Yet, from the time Gatorade was invented until stem cell
research became a present-day reality, the prevailing private benefit doctrine has never
provided a sufficient, logical analytical process by which to determine appropriate uses of
tax exemption-financed assets.
141

I do not use the term in the pejorative sense.
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It is impossible and unwise to formulate a standard of private benefit that leads to a
singular resulting public good. It is entirely appropriate and not at all inconsistent with
the eclectic nature of the charitable sector that the law require a well-defined and
articulated process by which charitable organizations determine the public good. This
should be a sort of due diligence that will make it less likely that the public good will be
sacrificed for private gain. The resolution of the private benefit doctrine in this article
does not create issue with any particular outcome vis-à-vis the public good, but seeks to
articulate and explicate a standard methodology by which tax-subsidized organizations
may determine the public good by which that determination may be evaluated at its
extreme boundaries.
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